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Abstract—Software-defined networking (SDN) is a promising1
network paradigm for future Internet. The centralized con-2
troller and simplified switches replace the traditional complex3
forwarding devices, and make network management convenient.4
However, the switches in SDN currently have limited ternary5
content addressable memory to store specific routing rules from6
the controller. This bottleneck provokes cyber attacks to over-7
load the switches. Despite existing some countermeasures for8
such attacks, they are proposed based on simplified attack pat-9
terns. In this paper, we review the table-overflow attack using a10
sophisticated attack pattern. In the attack pattern, attack flows11
are targeted at their middle hops instead of endpoints. We first12
define potential targets in the network topology, then we pro-13
pose three specific traffic features and a monitoring mechanism14
to detect and locate the attackers. Further, we propose a mitiga-15
tion mechanism to limit the attack rate using the token bucket16
model. With the control of token add rate and bucket capac-17
ity, it avoids the table overflow on the victim switch. Extensive18
simulations in different types of topologies and experiments19
in our testbed are provided to show the performance of our20
proposal.21
Index Terms—Software-defined networking, OpenFlow, com-22
munication system security, table-overflow attack.23
I. INTRODUCTION24
SOFTWARE-DEFINED Networking (SDN) is considered25 as one promising next generation network architecture26
because of its high flexibility in network management. Many27
companies, such as Google and Amazon, have deployed SDN28
devices in their backbone and data center [1], [2]. The key29
concept of SDN lies in the decoupling of the data plane and30
the control plane [3]. In SDN, the switches are free from rigid31
routing computation and can be focused on packet forwarding.32
The centralized controller now is in charge of the routing rule33
computation and assignment.34
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Since the switches become highly primitive, the assigned 35
routing rules from the controller are expected to be precise. 36
Currently, OpenFlow [4] is the most widely used control link 37
protocol owing to its fine-grained routing rules (i.e., flow 38
entries) and abundant flow statistics. To support OpenFlow 39
protocol better, the switches have to use ternary content 40
addressable memory (TCAM) to store flow entries. However, 41
considering the high cost and highpower consumption [5], the 42
current OpenFlow-enabled switches usually have limited flow 43
table, which supports a few thousand flow entries [6], [7]. 44
For example, without the external TCAM, the NoviSwitch 45
2150 [8] can only store 16,384 flow entries. 46
As a result, how to use such limited cache efficiently 47
and safely has been an active field of research. To 48
help the switches store more flow entries without adding 49
TCAMs, several proposals attempt to split the workload 50
between the switches [9], [10] or aggregate redundant flow 51
entries [11], [12]. Although these proposals are useful for nor- 52
mal users, they could be inefficient when attackers attempt to 53
exhaust the switches. We call such attacks the table-overflow 54
attack in this paper. Many recent studies [13]–[15] have paid 55
attention to the table-over flow attack due to its significant 56
negative impact, including higher energy consumption, flow 57
table overflow and normal communication breakdown. 58
While the awareness of the table-overflow attack has 59
been raised, existing studies [13]–[17], [32] mainly consider 60
the attack with simplified attack patterns. In the simplified 61
attack patterns, only one or a few attackers attempt to over- 62
load a target switch using lots of unmatched attack flows. 63
Moreover, the table-overflow attackers are assumed to be 64
brute-force. It means that, the attackers choose their com- 65
mon ingress or egress (physically attached) switch as the 66
target. Based on the simplified cases, a few security sug- 67
gestions and countermeasures [18], [32] are proposed in the 68
literature. 69
However, in the real world operation, a sophisticated attack 70
pattern is more attractive to the cyber attackers. In the 71
sophisticated attack pattern, a group of attackers launch the 72
table-overflow attack to a same target switch. And the tar- 73
get switch is a middle hop switch instead of their physically 74
attached switches. Since when attackers launch the table- 75
overflow attack to their physically attached switch, they risk 76
exposing themselves. Besides, the flow table consumption on 77
the target switch (we call these consumption the attack pay- 78
ment) causes the same amount of flow table consumption on 79
their physically attached switches (we call these consumption 80
the attack cost). Therefore, the table-overflow attack is more 81
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likely to be launched by a group of attackers with the pur-82
pose of splitting the attack cost on their physically attached83
switches and hiding themselves.84
In the sophisticated attack pattern, the attackers tend to85
choose a hot switch which has fewer vacancies in the flow86
table as the target switch. Their attack flows use the target87
switch as the middle hop instead of the endpoints, because88
when lots of abnormal flows share the same traffic feature,89
such as the destination IP, these flows trigger an alarm in90
the existing security mechanisms [18], [19]. To identify a hot91
switch, an attacker may seek to use some common social92
engineering attacks to the network manager, or use route93
trace tools, or even invade the central controller to obtain the94
network topology to locate a hot switch.95
Knowing the basic characteristics of the sophisticated table-96
overflow attack, the objective of our work is to defend against97
it in SDN. Given an SDN topology, we first build a mathe-98
matical model to formulate the flow table consumption and99
the attack. Based on it, we define the potential targets. Then100
we propose three traffic features and a monitoring mechanism101
to detect the table-overflow attack and locate the attackers.102
Further, we propose a mitigation mechanism to limit the rate103
of attack flows using the token bucket model. It controls the104
token add rate and the bucket capacity with the consideration105
of the current flow table vacancy on the victim switch. Both106
the monitoring and mitigation mechanisms are embedded into107
the original routing process of SDN. Extensive simulations108
and experiments are conducted to evaluate our proposal. Here109
we summarize the main contributions of this paper.110
• Most of the related studies investigate the table-overflow111
attack using simplified attack patterns. In this work, we112
consider a sophisticated attack pattern and propose a113
countermeasure to the sophisticated table-overflow attack.114
• We build a practical mathematical model to formulate the115
flow table consumption and the attack. We provide a way116
to define the potential targets of the table-overflow attack.117
• Three specific traffic features and a monitoring mech-118
anism are proposed during the original routing process119
of SDN. It detects the attack and locates the attacker120
attached switches.121
• A mitigation mechanism is proposed using the token122
bucket model. Given the current flow table vacancy on123
the victim switch, it limits the rate of attack flows and124
avoids the table overflow under different attack rates.125
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some related126
work is introduced in Section II. The basic concept of SDN127
and the table-overflow attack is provided in Section III. In128
Section IV, we build the mathematical model to formulate129
the flow table consumption and the table-overflow attack.130
The monitoring mechanism and the mitigation mechanism are131
proposed in Sections V and VI, respectively. In Section VII,132
we show the simulation and experiment results of our proposal.133
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VIII.134
II. RELATED WORK135
In this section, we introduce some related work about the136
table overflow problem of SDN.137
A. Table Overflow Avoidance Under Normal Circumstances 138
For SDN-enabled switch vendors, such as NoviFlow [8] and 139
Pica8 [20], the only mature way to store more flow entries 140
seems to be adding the number of TCAMs. In the litera- 141
ture, to find a better solution, the existing studies mainly go 142
along two directions, i.e., heterogeneous flow entry and cache 143
optimization. 144
The key concept of heterogeneous flow entry approaches is 145
that not all arrived flows need an individual wildcard flow entry 146
stored in TCAM. For example, DevoFlow [21] classifies flows 147
into two types: the transient mice flow and the persistent ele- 148
phant flow. It clones the mice flow’s packet header to create an 149
exact-match flow entry. Then the exact-match flow entry can 150
be moved from TCAM to RAM. Similarly, Nguyen et al. [22] 151
only assign specific rules to the elephant flows, the mice flows 152
are handled by the default rules in switches. CacheFlow [23] 153
only stores the most popular rules in a small TCAM. The rest 154
of rules are cached in software switches using RAM. The rules 155
stored in TCAM have a higher priority than the rules stored 156
in RAM. 157
Besides, Banerjee and Kannan [24] propose Tag-In-Tag 158
based on their former study about TCAM [5]. They utilize 159
a combination of path tag and flow tag (24 bits in total) 160
instead of the original flow entry (356 bits in total) to match 161
a flow. The path tag exploits the path similarity between dif- 162
ferent flows. Likely, Huang et al. [25] divide flow entries into 163
the universal rules and the local rules. They conduct different 164
partition and allocation algorithms for different kinds of flow 165
entries. In this way, these proposals reduce redundant rules in 166
switches. 167
In contrast, the key concept of cache optimization 168
approaches is that not all cached flow entries in TCAM need 169
to follow a same and rigid update mechanism. For example, 170
SmartTime [26] sets the idle timeout dynamically according to 171
its observation of the repeated flow and the real time TCAM 172
occupation. It aims to improve the utilization of TCAM (i.e., 173
use a smaller idle timeout) while ensuring that TCAM miss 174
does not increase (i.e., fewer flows are repeated). Similarly, 175
MWFP [27] adjusts the idle timeout of flows with the con- 176
sideration of the average interval between packets. It reduces 177
the TCAM updates by setting a bigger idle timeout for the 178
long-distance and unstable flow. 179
Besides, FDRC [28] aims at fine-grained cache manage- 180
ment. It sets a timer for each flow entry to estimate the time 181
of next hit. The rarely hit rules have a larger timer value and 182
will be evicted once TCAM is full. Likely, MMS [29] cleans 183
the rarely used or obsolete flow entries. It resides in the SDN 184
controller and monitors the activity of applications. To free 185
TCAM in the switches, MMS evicts the flow entries once 186
their applications in the controller are terminated. 187
B. Table Overflow Avoidance Under DoS Attacks 188
The aforementioned proposals improve the accommodation 189
of flow entries in SDN, however they are inefficient to handle 190
malicious flows from cyber attackers. It has been proven that 191
the limited flow table space can be easily exhausted by table- 192
overflow attackers [16], [17]. To deal with such security issues, 193
several mechanisms are proposed recently. 194
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Fig. 1. SDN’s routing process: global network view establishment, routing
rule calculation and routing rule assignment.
AVANT-GUARD [30] is a security mechanism embedded in195
the SDN-enabled switches. It consists of a connection migra-196
tion module and an actuating trigger module. The connection197
migration module is designed to monitor TCP session fail-198
ures. The actuating trigger module is used to activate several199
predefined routing rules when lots of TCP session failures are200
observed. In this way, it protects the controller and switches201
from the SYN flooding attack.202
Dong et al. [31] propose a detection method for the DDoS203
attack to the controller and switches. Such a DDoS attack uti-204
lizes a large number of low-traffic flows to exhaust SDN’s rout-205
ing system. The low-traffic flows have fewer packets than the206
normal flows, and they can lead to significant resources con-207
sumption in both the data plane and the control plane. In the208
proposal, the authors use SPRT (Sequential Probability Ration209
Test) to control the false negative and false positive rates.210
The most related work to this paper is the QoS-aware mit-211
igation strategy [32]. It prepares the idle flow table resources212
in the data plane for the table-overflow attack. By redirecting213
attack flows from saturated switches to idle switches, it makes214
SDN more resilience to such an attack. However, since the215
redirection action cannot limit the attack rate, its performance216
relies on the amount of idle flow table resources, and it may217
be unsatisfactory when there are no adequate idle switches218
or the attack rate is high. Moreover, the effectiveness of this219
approach relies on the identification of the attack. Since the220
authors did not provide a proper attack monitoring method, the221
effectiveness of their proposed solution is somewhat limited.222
III. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE223
In this section, we introduce the original routing process of224
OpenFlow-based SDN and the table-overflow attack.225
A. The Routing Process of OpenFlow-Based SDN226
According to OpenFlow protocol, the SDN-enabled switch227
has to register its configuration and status before it can forward228
packets in the network. During this process, the controller229
builds a topology of the entire network. As shown in Fig. 1,230
when an unmatched flow arrives at Ssrc, Ssrc sends a request231
to the controller. Then the controller traces the endpoint Sdst232
and finds the middle hop Smid in the established topology.233
To make sure that the arrived flow is continuously transmitted,234
all switches in the routing path have to install a flow entry.235
TABLE I
THE CAPACITIES OF MOST USED SWITCHES
During this routing process, the new arrived flow not only 236
leads to flow entry installations on its ingress switch Ssrc 237
and egress switch Sdst, but also on the middle hop (logically 238
attached) switch Smid. 239
B. The Table-Overflow Attack in SDN 240
Currently, the switches in OpenFlow-based SDN usually 241
have limited cache for flow entries. Table I shows the cache 242
sizes of different OpenFlow-enabled switches. We can see that 243
the OpenFlow-enabled switch generally can hold a few thou- 244
sands of flow entries. Such bottleneck provokes cyber attackers 245
to overload the switches. By generating lots of unmatched 246
flows in a short time, the attackers trick the controller into 247
assigning flow entries to a target switch intensively. Once the 248
cache of the target switch is full of these flow entries, the tar- 249
get switch will be paralysed and the legitimated flows will be 250
delayed or even dropped. 251
We note that the NoviSwitch 2128, 2122 and 1248 can 252
support 1 million of flow entries using large TCAMs. Such 253
amount of cache definitely can withstand most of the table- 254
overflow attack in the simplified model [13]–[17], [32]. In the 255
simplified attack model, the attack flows use the target switch as 256
their ingress or egress in their routing paths, e.g., Ssrc or Ssrc in 257
Fig. 1. Such attack flows can be easily aggregated by the target 258
switch according to their common ingress or egress. Unless 259
the brute-force attacker targets a switch with fewer vacancies 260
in the cache, the attacker has to generate attack flows at a very 261
high rate. 262
However, in the sophisticated attack model, the attack flows 263
use the target switch as their middle hop in their routing paths, 264
e.g., Smid in Fig. 1. Using different paths with a same middle 265
hop, the attackers can accumulate useless flow entries on the 266
middle hop. In the real world operation, the switch serves as 267
a middle hop frequently in the network. This makes lots of 268
available routing paths for the attackers. More importantly, 269
such attack flows are difficult to be aggregated according to 270
their common middle hop. To overflow a switch using large 271
TCAMs, the sophisticated attack can utilize more routing paths 272
and share the attack cost accordingly. 273
Besides, adding the number of TCAMs in the switch is an 274
efficient way to improve the reliability of switch but not secu- 275
rity. Especially for the sophisticated table-overflow attackers, 276
adding cache may provoke more intense attacks. Therefore, 277
the motivation of this paper is to keep the limited or finite 278
cache from the sophisticated attackers. 279
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 280
In this section, we build a mathematical model to formu- 281
late the above mentioned table-overflow attack. When switches 282
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Fig. 2. Classification of the flow table consumption.
finish their registration, the global view in the network con-283
troller can be viewed as an undirected and unweighted graph284
G = (S, L), where S represents the switch set and L is285
the physical link set. We use N to denote the number of286
switches. Then we formulate the flow table consumption in287
a discrete time model, where the time horizon consists of288
a series of time slots. We use l to denote the length of the289
time slot.290
During a time slot t, the flow entries assigned to Si are291
viewed as a set Rti. Then we define the flow table consumption292
of Si in time slot t as293
Ci(t) = card
(
Rti
)
, (1)294
where card(Rti) is the cardinality of set Rti. To give a further295
view of Ci(t), we divide Rti into two parts: the local flow used296
set Rt,Li and the foreign flow used set R
t,F
i . The local flow of297
Si uses Si as the ingress or egress switch, the foreign flow of298
Si uses Si as the middle hop. For example, as shown in Fig. 2,299
the users’ flow is a local flow for S1 and S4, and it is a foreign300
flow for S2 and S3. It is obvious that Rt,Li and R
t,F
i have the301
following properties:302
{
Rt,Li ∪ Rt,Fi = Rti
Rt,Li ∩ Rt,Fi = ∅.
(2)303
Then we define the local flow consumption (i.e., CLi (t)) and304
the foreign flow consumption (i.e., CFi (t)) as305
⎧
⎨
⎩
CLi (t) = card
(
Rt,Li
)
CFi (t) = card
(
Rt,Fi
)
.
(3)306
Therefore, the flow table consumption Ci(t) is307
Ci(t) = CLi (t) + CFi (t). (4)308
We use 〈Si ·Sj〉 to denote the routing path between Si and Sj309
(flows from Si to Si are not considered in this paper). For the310
normal flows on the path, we formulate them as the generally311
used Poisson process [32]. Considering the fact that different312
paths have different amount of traffic. We use λi·j to denote313
the unmatched flow arrival rate of path 〈Si · Sj〉 and set it314
randomly for different paths. All symbols and variables used315
in this paper are summarized in Table II.316
When the table-overflow attackers choose Si as the target317
switch, they generate flows on different paths which include318
Si as the middle hop. These attack flows lead to a huge foreign319
flow consumption CFi (t) during the attack.320
TABLE II
VARIABLES AND NOTIONS
However, not all switches are attractive for attackers. As 321
shown in Fig. 2, the instinct of the attackers makes them 322
choose a hot switch (e.g., S2) instead of S1 as the target, since 323
S2 is responsible for more normal flows and has fewer vacan- 324
cies than S1. Therefore, before we monitor and further mitigate 325
the table-overflow attack, we should identify the potential 326
targets in a given graph G. 327
V. MONITORING THE TABLE-OVERFLOW ATTACK 328
In this section, we first define the potential targets according 329
to their common feature. Then we design three traffic features 330
to monitor the attack for the potential targets. Finally, we show 331
how our monitoring mechanism is embedded into the routing 332
process of SDN. 333
A. Definition of Potential Targets 334
To find potential targets in a given graph G, we can first 335
exclude some switches that are secure from the table-overflow 336
attack. Since the attackers generate attack flows on different 337
paths which include the target as the middle hop. Switches 338
that only act as the ingress or egress are not the candidate 339
of potential target. For example, as the graph G shown in 340
Fig. 3(a), S1, S4 and S5 are not middle hops in any routing 341
paths in G, and their foreign flow consumption CFi (t) ≡ 0 since 342
their degree Di = 1. Therefore, we select potential targets from 343
switches which satisfy Di > 1. 344
We use Algorithm 1 to build virtual graphs for switches with 345
Di > 1. As shown in Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c), each virtual graph 346
consists of a central switch Si and several virtual neighbors. 347
The virtual neighbors are the paths in graph G, which include 348
the central switch as the middle hop. When flows traverse in 349
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Fig. 3. An example of building virtual graphs using G, in the virtual graphs,
the paths in G represent virtual neighbors.
Algorithm 1: Building Virtual Graphs
Input: graph G
Output: virtual graphs
Starget = ∅ PathInG = ∅ VirtualNeighbori = ∅ di = 0;
for each pair of switches (Sx, Sy) do〈
Sx, Sy
〉 = ShortestPath(Sx, Sy);
PathInG = PathInG ∪ 〈Sx, Sy
〉
;
end
for i = 1; i ≤ N; i + + do
if Di = 1 then
E[CFi (t)] = 0;
end
if Di > 1 then
while all paths in PathInG are checked 	= true
do
if Si ∩
〈
Sx, Sy
〉 	= ∅ && Si is the middle hop then
di = di + 1;
VirtualNeighbori = VirtualNeighbori ∪
〈
Sx, Sy
〉
;
end
end
end
end
graph G, the controller finds the shortest (in terms of hop,350
delay or some commercial cost) path between its ingress and351
egress switches. In this paper, the least number of hops is the352
shortest path. Then we use di to denote the virtual degree of Si,353
and the virtual degrees of S2 and S3 are 3 and 5, respectively.354
Then the question becomes whether we can simply treat all355
switches with Di > 1 as the potential targets in G. For small356
scale graphs, this definition may be workable since there are357
a few switches in the topology. While for large scale graphs358
this is not sufficient and can lead to lots of potential targets.359
Meanwhile, it should be note that, the virtual neighbors of the360
switch with small di may also belong to the switch with large361
di. For example, in Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c), two thirds of the362
S2’s virtual neighbors are also belong to S3. It indicates that,363
for large scale graphs, even attackers try to overload a switch364
with small di, some switches with large di are also involved365
into the attack. And due to the fact that switches with large di366
usually has fewer flow table vacancy than the ones with small367
di, switches with large di will be overloaded first.368
It’s obviously hard to draw a clear line between switches369
with large di and small di, and make sure switches with small370
di will not exhausted before the rest under any rates of table- 371
overflow attacks. 372
Therefore, we narrow the range of potential targets with the 373
consideration of a simplified traffic model in graph G. In this 374
simplified traffic model, each path has the same flow arrival 375
rate λp. It should be noted that we do not use this model to 376
monitor the table-overflow attack, what we do is to provide a 377
possible way to narrow the range of potential targets in graph 378
G. Then the expected local flow consumption during a single 379
time slot is 380
E
[
CLi (t)
] = (N − 1)λpl. (5) 381
And the expected foreign flow consumption during a single 382
time slot is 383
E
[
CFi (t)
] =
{
0, Di = 1
diλpl, Di > 1
(6) 384
according to (3). To define the potential targets, we use the 385
foreign-local ratio as following, 386
E
[
CFi (t)
]
E
[
CLi (t)
] = diλpl
(N − 1)λpl =
di
N − 1 . (7) 387
It reflects the topology feature of Si in graph G. When the 388
foreign-local ratio is bigger than 1, i.e., di > (N − 1), switch 389
Si has more paths for its foreign flows than its local flows, 390
and it may have less flow table space than the rest switches. 391
In this paper, we denote the switch with di > (N − 1) as the 392
potential target. For example, as shown in Fig. 3, S3 is the 393
potential target while the rest switches are not. As discussed, 394
its hard to draw a clear line between switches with large di and 395
small di, we do not indicate that switches with di ≤ (N − 1) 396
(like S2 in Fig. 3) are free from the table-overflow attack. 397
In contrast, we believe that some of the excluded switches 398
can be added as the potential targets by other definitions with 399
different viewpoints. And as for the numerous switches with 400
di ≤ (N −1), the passive detection method [34] can be a more 401
proper way to monitor the table-overflow attack. 402
B. Traffic Features 403
Knowing the potential targets, we propose the following 404
traffic features to monitor the attack: growth of foreign flow 405
consumption (GFFC), deviation of flow amount (DFA) and 406
commonness of flow entry (CFE). 407
1) Growth of Foreign Flow Consumption (GFFC): 408
Although the attackers can hide themselves by splitting the 409
attack cost, to exhaust the flow table in the target switch Si, the 410
attack payment CFi (t) must be noteworthy. Therefore, GFFC 411
is defined as 412
GFFCi(t) = C
F
i (t)
l
=
card
(
Rt,Fi
)
l
. (8) 413
During the table-overflow attack, GFFCi(t) increases linearly 414
with the attack rate. A larger GFFCi(t) indicates a burst of 415
foreign flow consumption in Si. 416
2) Deviation of Flow Amount (DFA): The burst of foreign 417
flow consumption may also be caused by a sudden increase of 418
normal flows. In order to differentiate the table-overflow attack 419
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from the normal flow bust, we propose DFA. The burst normal420
flows are usually related to special events, such as popular421
live matches and sudden news. These flows from distributed422
users rarely share the same middle hop in the network. In423
contrast, the attack flows have a strong directionality, they are424
clustered at the di paths of the target switch. Therefore, DFA425
is defined as426
DFAi(t) =
P
{
FAdi = card
(
Rt,Fi
)}
P
{
FAG = 12
∑N
i=1 card
(
Rt,Li
)} , (9)427
where variable FAdi and variable FAG represent the arrived428
flow amount of the di paths and the whole network in time429
slot t, respectively. We use λFi and λG to denote the flow arrival430
rate of the di paths and the whole network, then variable FAdi431
follows Poisson(λFi l) and variable FAG follows Poisson(λGl).432
During the table-overflow attack, all the burst attack flows433
are clustered at the di paths, and they make DFAi(t) decease434
greatly. During the normal flow burst, only part of the burst435
flows are accidentally clustered at the di paths, and they make436
DFAi(t) change slightly.437
3) Commonness of Flow Entry (CFE): To locate the attack-438
ers, we measure the switches presented in the virtual graph439
using CFE. When Sj is the attacker attached switch and Si is440
the target, the number of common flow entries between Rt,Lj441
and Rt,Fi increases greatly. Therefore, CFE is defined as442
CFEj(t) =
card
(
Rt,Lj ∩ Rt,Fi
)
λ
F,j
i l
, (10)443
where Rt,Lj ∩Rt,Fi represents the common flow entries between444
Si and Sj. We use λF,ji to denote the arrival rate of unmatched445
flows that use Sj as the ingress of egress and Si as the mid-446
dle hop. Then λF,ji l is the expected number of common flow447
entries in Rt,Lj ∩Rt,Fi . During the table-overflow attack, since the448
attacker sends lots of flows through its physically connected449
switch Sj, these attack flows can make CFEj(t) increase greatly450
and become larger comparing with the normal switches.451
C. Embedding the Monitoring Mechanism452
To make our traffic features practical and meaningful, we453
propose a monitoring mechanism which can be embedded into454
the original routing process of SDN. Considering the fact that455
the control link of SDN is limited and unsuitable for heavy456
statistics applications [35], our monitoring mechanism uti-457
lizes the existing interactions between the switches and the458
controller as shown in Fig. 4.459
When SDN-enabled switches finish their registrations, our460
monitoring mechanism views the established topology in the461
controller as the graph G = (S, L). Using Algorithm 1, the462
potential targets in G can be identified. During this step,463
the controller gets the λFi , λG and λ
F,j
i according to the flow464
arrival rate λi,j of each path and the network topology. Next,465
for example Smid is a potential target and an unmatched flow466
uses Smid as the middle hop in its flow path, after the controller467
assigns the flow entries to each hop, the monitoring mech-468
anism updates the local flow consumptions of Ssrc and Sdst469
Fig. 4. Embedded monitoring steps in the SDN routing process.
and the foreign flow consumption of Smid. Based on this, our 470
proposed traffic features can be calculated without getting data 471
plane statistics from the SDN-enabled switches. With enough 472
traffic feature samples under normal circumstances and table- 473
overflow attacks, our monitoring mechanism can recognize 474
such an attack and locate the attacker attached switches. 475
VI. MITIGATE THE TABLE-OVERFLOW ATTACK 476
In this section, we propose a mitigation mechanism for the 477
table-overflow attack using the token bucket model. Our mit- 478
igation mechanism aims to keep the user’s transmission rate 479
while limiting the attacker’s transmission rate. 480
A. Flow Entry Token Bucket 481
The classic token bucket is a model used to control the 482
packets’ average transmission rate and burstiness in computer 483
networks. In that model, the token is added into the bucket at 484
a fixed rate and the bucket has finite capacity. When a packet 485
is transmitted, a token is removed from the bucket. Therefore, 486
the token add rate decides the average transmission rate of 487
packets and the bucket capacity determines the burstiness of 488
the packet transmission. 489
Given the location of attacker by our monitoring mecha- 490
nism, we build an FETB (flow entry token bucket) for the 491
attacker attached switch to limit its transmission rate of attack 492
flows. When a flow from the attacker attached switch tries to 493
use the victim switch as the middle hop, a token is removed 494
from the FETB. To control the average transmission rate of 495
the attack flows, the fixed token add rate (denoted by TAR) is 496
defined as 497
TAR = λF,ji , (11) 498
when Si is the victim switch and Sj is the attacker attached 499
switch. 500
Meanwhile, we set the bucket capacity (denoted by BC) 501
with the consideration of the current flow table vacancy on 502
the victim switch. It should be noted that, given BC and TAR, 503
the attack time (denoted by T) and the attack rate (denoted by 504
AR) satisfy that 505
T = BC
AR − TAR , AR > TAR. (12) 506
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Fig. 5. The working process of the flow entry token bucket.
Since the attacker always sends non-repeating unmatched507
packets, the flow entries for the attack flows are removed by508
the idle timeout. Denoting the idle timeout value as IT , we509
can calculate the maximum table consumption of the attack510
(denoted as MTC) by511
MTC =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
T · AR + (IT − T) · TAR = BC + IT · TAR,
T < IT
(
⇔ AR > BCIT + TAR
)
;
IT · AR,
T ≥ IT
(
⇔ BCIT + TAR ≥ AR > TAR
)
.
512
(13)513
For different attack rates, we note that the maximum value of514
MTC is (BC + IT · TAR). Since the current flow table vacancy515
(denoted by FTV) on the victim switch can be acquired by the516
controller using the Controller-to-Switches Messages [4], and517
the attacker attached switch’s proportion is λ
F,j
i
λi
, to prevent the518
attacker overloads the victim switch, the maximum value of519
MTC should satisfy520
BC + IT · TAR ≤ FTV λ
F,j
i
λi
. (14)521
Therefore, the bucket capacity of the FETB is522
BC = λF,ji
(
FTV
λi
− IT
)
. (15)523
B. Embedding the Mitigation Mechanism524
To make our work practical, we embed the mitigation525
mechanism into the original routing process of SDN shown526
Section III. As the example shown in Fig. 5, when the moni-527
toring mechanism detects a table-overflow attack against Smid528
and locates the attacker at Sattack, it activates the mitigation529
mechanism. The mitigation mechanism uses the Controller-530
to-Switch Messages [4] to make sure the current FTV of Smid.531
Based on this, the FETB for Sattack is established, and its BC532
and TAR can be calculated according to (15) and (11).533
After this, when a flow from Sattack tries to use Smid as the534
middle hop, Sattack sends the routing request to controller. The535
controller removes a token from the FETB and assigns routing536
rules to each switch in the flow path. If there are no tokens in537
the FETB, the flow is cached or discarded at Sattack. Since the538
burstiness in the FETB model is determined by BC, and we539
have set BC with the consideration of the current flow table 540
vacancy, the transmission rate of attack flows can be limited 541
at Sattack. In contrast, the flow from Snormal can be transmitted 542
without a token. 543
However, attackers may repeat their attack flows in time 544
to avoid attack flows being evicted by the idle timeout. In 545
this case, despite limiting the attack rate at Sattack, the fixed 546
token add rate may let the attackers occupy the victim switch 547
slowly. Therefore, we use a dynamic token add rate, once the 548
number of flow entries caused by the attacker attached switch 549
exceeds their expected value FTV λ
F,j
i
λi
. The token add rate is 550
determined by the rate of Flow Removed Message [4] from Si. 551
When a flow from the attacker attached switch is finished at 552
Si, its Flow Removed Message from Si makes a token added 553
into the bucket. In this way, FETB protects the switch against 554
such repeated attack flows. 555
VII. SIMULATION AND RESULT 556
In this section, we first present simulations to demonstrate 557
the performance of our monitoring mechanism in WAN, LAN 558
and data center scenarios. Then we present experiments in 559
our testbed to demonstrate the performance of our mitigation 560
mechanism for the table-overflow attack. 561
A. Monitoring the Table-Overflow Attack 562
1) Simulation Scenarios and Key Parameters: In this paper 563
we perform our simulation over three typical types of SDN 564
application scenarios: WAN, LAN and data center. For the 565
WAN scenario, we study the recent simulation instance of soft- 566
ware defined WAN [36] and utilize the Barabasi-Albert (BA) 567
model [37] to build the network topologies with the property 568
of scale free. For the LAN scenario, we adopt the real router- 569
level dataset from CAIDA [38]. The dataset is computed by 570
the Internet Topology Data Kit (ITDK) under LAN router- 571
level topologies. For the data center, we utilize the BCube(n, k) 572
model [39] to build the network topologies, where n means the 573
port number of each switch and k means the recursion times. 574
In the BCube model, both switches and servers are able to 575
forward flows while only servers are the endpoints of paths. 576
Users or attackers are only connected with or reside in servers. 577
We build different scales of topologies for each type of 578
simulation scenario. For the WAN and LAN scenarios, we 579
build the networks with the switch number N varying from 100 580
to 1000. For the data center scenario, as the related study [36] 581
recommended, we apply BCube(n, k) model with n varying 582
from 8 to 18 when k is 1 and 2. Since the number of switches 583
in the BCube topology is nk · (k + 1), the switch number N of 584
the data center topology scales from 16 to 972. 585
In the simulation topologies, as shown in the latter part 586
of this paper, the potential target switch generally holds 587
responsible for hundreds of paths. Considering the traffic char- 588
acteristics shown in the related studies [5], [40] that the hot 589
switch can receive thousands of new flows per second, we set 590
the average flow arrival rate of each path as about 10 flows per 591
second. Besides, since different path holds different amount 592
of traffic, we further set the flow arrival rate of each path 593
randomly between 1 to 20 flows per second. 594
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Fig. 6. The virtual degree di of each switch in the BA and real router-level
graphs, N = 500.
Fig. 7. From N = 100 to N = 1000, the number of the potential targets in
the BA and real router-level graphs.
2) Simulation Results: As aforementioned in Algorithm 1, we595
define the potential targets using the switches’ virtual degrees.596
Fig. 6 shows the virtual degrees of the switches in BA graph597
and real router-lever graph when their sizes are 500. According598
to the di = N − 1 line, there are 12 and 6 potential targets in599
BA graph and real router-level graph. Since the BA graph is600
built by adding nodes to a small seed topology, the potential601
targets of BA graph are mainly distributed in the earlier added602
nodes. When N varies from 100 to 1000, we get the number of603
the potential targets shown in Fig. 7. In general, the number of604
the potential targets increases with the topology size N.605
In contrast, as shown in Fig. 8, the switches in the BCube606
graph have the same virtual degree, which is decided by the607
parameter n and k and satisfies di =
(
n
2
) · nk, the detail expla-608
nation can be found in the Appendix. With the increasing of609
n, the virtual degree of switch increases exponentially and it610
deviates from the di = N − 1 line obviously.611
From Fig. 8, we can get some further results. First, due to the612
dense placement of servers (n(k+1)) and the sparse placement of613
switches (nk · (k+1)), switches in the BCube-based data center614
face much more forwarding task comparing with the ones in615
the WAN and LAN scenarios, and they are more likely to be616
compromised by the table-overflow attack. Second, the heavy617
forwarding task of switches in BCube(n, k) model (each switch618
maintains
(
n
2
) · nk paths) makes di > N − 1 a loose definition619
for potential target. However, since the BCube(n, k) topology620
is homogeneous (each switch has the same virtual degree), our621
definition is suitable. Last, the recursive property of BCube622
makes switches homogeneous in the topology, therefore the623
Fig. 8. The virtual degree di of switches in the BCube graphs, the virtual
degree di of switches in the BCube(n, k) graph satisfies that di =
(n
2
) · nk .
Fig. 9. From n = 8 to n = 18, the number of the potential targets in the
BCube(n, k) graphs.
Fig. 10. For a certain target, the switch or server numbers of different entropy
features.
number of potential targets in BCube graph increases linearly 624
with the growth of topology size as shown in Fig. 9. 625
To evaluate the performance of our monitoring mechanism, 626
we first compare our DFA with the entropy-based traffic fea- 627
ture. It should be noted that, the accuracy of the entropy-based 628
traffic feature depends on the randomness of the flows [18]. 629
However, switches (or servers in the BCube graph) have dif- 630
ferent numbers of paths which use the target as the middle 631
hop. This affects the randomness of the flows. For a certain 632
potential target, Fig. 10 shows the switch or server numbers of 633
different entropy features. The “positive” switches or servers 634
have fewer paths while the “negative” switches have more 635
paths than the average value. When the attackers send flows 636
through the “positive” devices, the entropy features of the 637
target increase. When the attackers send flows through the 638
“negative” devices, the entropy features of the target decrease. 639
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Fig. 11. DFA and the Src-IP entropy values, attacker attached switches or
servers are “negative” devices, l = 10 seconds, 10 attackers, the attack rate
is 500 flows/s, (a) BA model, N = 500, (b) real router-level, N = 500, (C)
BCube model, N = 507.
Fig. 12. DFA and the Src-IP entropy values, attacker attached switches
or servers are “positive” devices, l = 10 seconds, 10 attackers, the attack
rate is 500 flows/s, (a) BA model, N = 500, (b) real router-level, N = 500,
(C) BCube model, N = 507.
Using the normalized DFA and normalized Src-Ip entropy,640
Fig. 11 shows the monitoring results when attacker attached641
switches or servers are “negative” devices. We can see that,642
both features can differentiate the table-overflow attack, and643
DFA shows a better sensitivity.644
However, when attacker attached switches or servers are645
“positive” devices, the entropy-based method is not feasible.646
Fig. 12 shows the monitoring results when attacker attached647
switches or servers are “positive” devices. We can see that, the648
Src-Ip entropy value increases and leads to a False Negative649
(FN) error while DFA feature keeps a well sensitivity to the650
attack.651
Then we compare our GFFC with the average attack rate of652
attackers in Fig. 13. As discussed in Section V, the attackers653
can hide themselves by splitting the attack cost. We can see654
that, with the growth of attack numbers, it becomes harder to655
identify an attack according to their request rate. To launch the656
500 flows/s table-overflow attack, the average attack cost of the657
15 attackers is only less than 35 flows/s, which can be mistaken658
for normal traffic fluctuations. However, the attack payment659
CFFC is noteworthy. As shown in Fig. 13, it grows linearly660
with the attack rate and is independent with the number of661
attackers.662
Fig. 13. GFFC and the average attack rate of attackers.
TABLE III
KEY PARAMETERS OF OUR EXPERIMENTS
Using DFA and GFFC, we monitor the table-overflow attack 663
in different types and scales of topologies, and we summarize 664
the results in Fig. 14. According to the Receiver Operating 665
Characteristic (ROC) curves and the Confusion Matrixes, we 666
can see that, our method achieves 100% accuracy with a 667
False Positive (FP) rate ranging from 6.3% to 13.7%. During 668
the simulations, as depicted by Fig. 14(b), Fig. 14(d) and 669
Fig. 14(f), our method archives an accuracy of 96.4% in the 670
BA graphs, an accuracy of 95.1% in the real router-level 671
graphs and an accuracy of 93.4% in the BCube graphs. 672
To further locate the attacker attached switches, we calculate 673
CFE when the table-overflow attack is identified. For BA and 674
real topologies, we get the CFE values shown in Fig. 15. The 675
CFE values of the normal switches range in (0.8, 1.2) while the 676
attack attached switches range in (1.5, 1.9). For the BCube, 677
as shown in Fig. 16, the CFE values of the normal servers 678
range in (0.7, 1.4) while the attack attached switches range in 679
(1.8, 2.0). 680
B. Evaluating the Mitigation Mechanism 681
1) Simulation Settings: To test the performance of our mit- 682
igation mechanism, we program the flow entry token bucket 683
as an application in OpenDaylight controller [41] using REST 684
API. We use OpenvSwitch [33] as the SDN-enabled switch. 685
The controller and each SDN-enabled switch are equipped 686
with an Intel Xeon E5606 CPU working at 2.13GHz and an 687
8G memory chip. They are operated with Ubuntu Linux 12.04. 688
We use two laptops to send and accumulate flow entries on 689
the middle hop switch. The attack flows are generated in the 690
form of the ICMP ping flood using Hping [42]. The parameters 691
that we used are listed in Table III. 692
2) Simulation Results: To avoid the table overflow on the 693
victim switch, we need to control the bucket capacity with 694
the consideration of the current flow table vacancy. According 695
to the experiment settings and the analysis of (15), the cal- 696
culation result of the maximum BC is 1000. Based on this, 697
the controller can limit the transmission rate of attack flows. 698
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Fig. 14. Monitoring performances, (a), (c) and (e) are ROCs of BA model,
real router-level and BCube model, (b) (d) and (f) are confusion matrixes of
BA model, real router-level and BCube model.
Fig. 15. N = 500, 10 attackers, for a certain target, the CFE values of
switches in the BA and real router-level graphs.
For different attack rates, we get the rate limiting results in699
Fig. 17. As can be seen, when the bucket has no tokens, the700
attack flows’ transmission rate is limited by the fixed token701
add rate. The higher the attack rate is, the earlier the limiting702
action comes. Over a long run, the number of the attack flows703
is limited to BC + t ∗ TAR.704
Since the MTC indicates the maximum allowed table705
consumption for the attackers, we record the flow table706
Fig. 16. n = 13, k = 2, 10 attackers, for a certain target, the CFE values of
servers in the BCube graph.
Fig. 17. The effect of FETB on the attacker attached switch.
Fig. 18. The effect of FETB on the victim switch.
consumptions of the attackers and summarize them in Fig. 18. 707
We can see that, with the rate limiting and the calculated 708
bucket capacity, the maximum flow table consumption of the 709
attackers is limited to MTC. Over a long run, the flow table 710
consumption of the attackers is IT ∗ TAR. 711
However, attackers may repeat their attack flows in time 712
to avoid attack flows being evicted by the idle timeout. To 713
simulate the effect of repeated attack flows, we force the con- 714
troller to assign static flow entries for the non-repeat attack 715
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Fig. 19. The effect of FETB on both the attacker attached switch and the
victim switch.
flows. The static flow entries have infinite idle timeout value,716
and they will not be removed until we delete them manually.717
In this case, the performance of FETB is shown in Fig. 19.718
We use the dynamic token add rate, once the number of flow719
entries caused by attack flows exceeds 2,000.720
Comparing with the recent QoS-aware mitigation strat-721
egy [32], which redirects attack flows to the idle peer switch,722
our mitigation mechanism limits the attack rate at the attacker723
attached switches. Using the proper bucket capacity and724
token add rate, FETB avoids the table overflow on the725
victim switch.726
VIII. CONCLUSION727
In this paper, we examined the table-overflow attack in728
SDN with practical considerations and concluded that exist-729
ing solutions were unable to protect the system under such730
an attack. To address this issue, we first proposed a monitor-731
ing mechanism to detect the table-overflow attack during the732
original routing process of SDN. Three traffic features were733
designed to differentiate the attack and locate the attackers.734
We then proposed a mitigation mechanism to reduce the trans-735
mission rate of attack flows on the attacker attached switch.736
We designed a flow entry token bucket model to avoid the737
table overflow on the victim switch. Extensive simulations738
were conducted to evaluate and show the effectiveness of our739
solution against the table-overflow attack.740
APPENDIX741
The BCube(n, k) model creates iterative graphs, the small-742
est iteration unit is BCube0 and the largest iteration unit is743
BCubek−1. For example, Fig. 20(a) shows the topology of744
BCube(4, 1). In fact, in such an iterative graph, the switches745
in different levels are homogenous and can be exchanged.746
When we exchange the level 0 switches with the level 1747
switches in Fig. 20(a), we get Fig. 20(b). The iterative feature748
of BCube(n, k) model makes the switches have the same di.749
Since the switches have the same di, we only need to find750
one switch’s di. The simplest way is to choose a switch in751
Fig. 20. The topology of BCube(4,1), the rectangles represent switches and
the circles represent servers, the switches have the same di = 24.
the highest level k, since only flows between two BCubek−1s 752
use it as the middle hop. Then according to the number of 753
severs in each BCubek−1 (i.e., nk) and the number of possible 754
combinations of two BCubek−1s (i.e.,
(
n
2
)), we get the di of 755
the level k switch as di =
(
n
2
) · nk. 756
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